Short answer: On DirectAdmin 1.712 with BIND, DirectAdmin DNSSEC takes two admin steps: generate the zone keys, then sign the zone (DNS Administration, or CMD_DNS_ADMIN with action=dnssec), and DirectAdmin then serves example.com.db.signed. Keys are ECDSA P-256 (algorithm 13), signatures last 35 days, and every DNS change re-signs the zone. The chain only works once you add the DS record from /var/named/dsset-example.com. at your registrar, and only if the DirectAdmin server is the authoritative DNS for the domain. (Reviewed October 2026.)
DirectAdmin 1.711 switched DNSSEC key generation to ECDSAP256SHA256 and removed the old key-generation options. We enabled DNSSEC on a test zone on a DirectAdmin 1.712 server, checked what BIND served, changed a record to see whether the zone was re-signed, and validated the result with delv.
Table of Contents
Before you start
- DirectAdmin must be the authoritative DNS. If the domain uses Cloudflare, your registrar’s DNS or another provider, DNSSEC is switched on there, not in DirectAdmin. Check with
dig +short NS example.com: the answer should be your DirectAdmin name servers. - DNSSEC must be enabled for the server.
da config-get dnssecshould return1(the default on our server). - The BIND tools must be installed. DirectAdmin calls
/usr/local/directadmin/scripts/dnssec.sh, which needsdnssec-keygenanddnssec-signzone. - Keep a copy of the zone file:
cp -a /var/named/example.com.db /root/example.com.db.before-dnssec.
dig +short NS example.com
da config-get dnssec
da config-get user_dnssec_control
command -v dnssec-keygen dnssec-signzone
user_dnssec_control=0 (our default) means only the admin can manage DNSSEC (see the da CLI guide for config-get and config-set); users get “User DNSSEC Control is disabled”.
Generate the keys and sign the zone
In the admin panel, open DNS Administration, choose the domain and use the DNSSEC controls: generate the keys first, then sign the zone. The same two steps through the API, as we ran them:
curl -s -u "admin:LOGIN_KEY" "https://server.example.com:2222/CMD_DNS_ADMIN?json=yes" \
--data "domain=example.com&action=dnssec&generate_keys=yes"
# {"success": "Zone keys generated"}
curl -s -u "admin:LOGIN_KEY" "https://server.example.com:2222/CMD_DNS_ADMIN?json=yes" \
--data "domain=example.com&action=dnssec&sign_zone=yes"
# {"success": "Zone signed"}
Use a login key, not the admin password (more on the API in DirectAdmin’s removed API endpoints); on the server, da api-url creates a temporary one. On our server the older calls to CMD_API_DNS_ADMIN with generate_keys did nothing and returned the zone file instead.
What DirectAdmin created
| File in /var/named/ | What it is |
|---|---|
example.com.ksk.key / .ksk.private | Key-signing key (flags 257). The private file is root-only (600). |
example.com.zsk.key / .zsk.private | Zone-signing key (flags 256). |
example.com.db.signed | The signed zone. /etc/named.conf now points the zone at this file. |
dsset-example.com. | The DS record for your registrar (note the trailing dot in the file name). |
The plain example.com.db stays the file DirectAdmin edits; the .signed copy is what BIND serves. BIND picked up the signed zone with DirectAdmin’s queued reload, about a minute after signing.
Check what BIND serves
dig +norec DNSKEY example.com @127.0.0.1 +noall +answer
dig +norec +dnssec A www.example.com @127.0.0.1 +noall +answer
On our server this returned two DNSKEY records, 257 3 13 (KSK) and 256 3 13 (ZSK), and every answer came with an RRSIG of algorithm 13. The signatures were valid for 35 days: incepted 20 October, expiring 24 November, which matches -e +3024000 (seconds) in DirectAdmin’s dnssec.sh.
Before touching the registrar, you can validate the whole zone locally with delv and the DS record as a temporary trust anchor:
d=example.com; ta=$(mktemp)
set -- $(awk 'NR==1 {print $4, $5, $6, $7$8}' /var/named/dsset-$d.)
printf 'trust-anchors {\n %s. static-ds %s %s %s "%s";\n};\n' $d $1 $2 $3 $4 > "$ta"
delv @127.0.0.1 -a "$ta" +root=$d A www.$d
rm -f "$ta"
Our test zone answered ; fully validated. If you see resolution failed here, do not publish the DS record yet.
Publish the DS record at the registrar
cat /var/named/dsset-example.com.
# example.com. IN DS 62901 13 2 AAC503E8...DB312181
At the registrar’s DNSSEC page, enter the four values: key tag (62901 in our test), algorithm 13 (ECDSAP256SHA256), digest type 2 (SHA-256) and the digest, without spaces. Some registrars ask for the public KSK instead; that is the 257 3 13 DNSKEY. We could not publish a DS record for our test zone, because its parent zone is hosted elsewhere, so this step is not tested by us.
After the registrar publishes it, check the chain from outside and with our DNSSEC checker:
dig +short DS example.com @1.1.1.1
dig +dnssec www.example.com @1.1.1.1 | grep -E "flags:.* ad"
The ad flag means the resolver validated the answer. If the domain stops resolving with SERVFAIL after the DS goes live, remove the DS record at the registrar first; that is the fastest way back.
DirectAdmin DNSSEC re-signing and expiry
- On every change: we added a TXT record through the API; within about a minute the
.signedfile was rewritten, the SOA serial went up and the new record had a fresh 35-day RRSIG. - Without changes: signatures still expire after 35 days, so zones must be re-signed regularly. A DirectAdmin forum report describes a monthly re-sign on the 1st; we could not wait that long on the test server, so monitor it rather than assume it.
A one-line check you can run from cron and alert on when fewer than 10 days are left:
exp=$(dig +norec +dnssec SOA example.com @127.0.0.1 +noall +answer | awk '$4=="RRSIG"{print $9; exit}')
echo "$exp" # e.g. 20261124210237 (UTC)
left=$(( ( $(date -ud "${exp:0:8} ${exp:8:2}:${exp:10:2}" +%s) - $(date +%s) ) / 86400 ))
[ "$left" -lt 10 ] && echo "DNSSEC signatures for example.com expire in $left days"
Turn DNSSEC off safely
Order matters: remove the DS record at the registrar first, wait at least the DS record’s TTL (often 1 to 2 days), and only then remove DNSSEC in DirectAdmin. Removing the keys while the DS is still published makes validating resolvers reject the domain.
How we tested
- Server: DirectAdmin 1.712 on AlmaLinux 9.8 with BIND 9.16.23, 20 October 2026.
- A test zone on the server: keys generated and zone signed through
CMD_DNS_ADMIN, answers checked withdigon the server, a TXT record added to check re-signing, and the zone validated withdelvusing the DS record as a trust anchor. - 21 October 2026: the
delvcheck above re-run as published (temporary file frommktemp, removed afterwards) on a freshly signed zone:; fully validated. - Not tested: publishing the DS record at a registrar (the test zone’s parent is hosted elsewhere), the monthly re-sign, key rollover, zones signed with RSA keys before 1.711, and Multi Server Setup.
FAQ
Which DNSSEC algorithm does DirectAdmin use?
On 1.711 and later, ECDSAP256SHA256 (algorithm 13) for both keys. Our 1.712 server generated a KSK and a ZSK with algorithm 13 and a SHA-256 (type 2) DS record.
Can DirectAdmin users enable DNSSEC themselves?
Only if the admin allows it. With user_dnssec_control=0 a user request is refused with “User DNSSEC Control is disabled”.
Do I need to re-sign the zone after editing DNS records?
No. On our server every change through DirectAdmin re-signed the zone within about a minute.
My domain uses Cloudflare DNS. Should I enable DNSSEC in DirectAdmin?
No. DNSSEC has to be enabled by whoever answers for the domain, so turn it on in Cloudflare and add Cloudflare’s DS record at the registrar.
At a glance

